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Abstract
Recently, a chaos-based image encryption scheme called RCES (also called RSES)
was proposed. This paper analyzes the security of RCES, and points out that it
is insecure against the known/chosen-plaintext attacks: the number of required
known/chosen plain-images is only one or two. In addition, the security of RCES
against the brute-force attack was overestimated. Both theoretical and experimental
analyses are given to show the performance of the suggested known/chosen-plaintext
attacks. The insecurity of RCES is due to its special design, which makes it a typical
example of insecure image encryption schemes. Some lessons are drawn from RCES
to show some common principles for ensuring the high level of security of an image
encryption scheme.
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1 Introduction
In the digital world today, the security of digital images becomes more and
more important, since the communications of digital products over networks
occur more and more frequently. Furthermore, special and reliable security
in storage and transmission of digital images is needed in many applications,
such as pay-TV, medical imaging systems, military image database and com-
munications as well as confidential video conferencing, etc. In recent years,
some consumer electronic devices, especially mobile phones and hand-held
devices, have also started to provide the function of saving and exchanging
digital images via the support of multimedia messaging services over wireless
networks.
To meet the challenges arising from different applications, good encryption
of digital images is necessary. The simplest way to encrypt an image is to
consider the 2-D image stream as a 1-D data stream, and then encrypt this
1-D stream with any available cipher [1]. Although such a simple way is suffi-
cient to protect digital images in some civil applications, encryption schemes
considering special features of digital images, such as the bulky size and the
large redundancy in uncompressed images, are still needed to provide better
overall performance and make the adoption of the encryption scheme easier
in the whole image processing system.
Since the 1990s, many specific algorithms have been proposed, aiming to pro-
vide better solutions to image encryption [2–22]. At the same time, cryptana-
lytic work on proposed image encryption schemes has also been developed, and
some existing schemes have been found to be insecure from the cryptograph-
ical point of view [23–32]. Due to the tight relationship between chaos and
cryptography [33, Chap. 2], chaotic systems have been widely used in image
encryption to realize diffusion and confusion in a good cipher [9–12,16–20]. For
a more comprehensive survey of the state of the art about image encryption
schemes, see [34–36].
The present paper focuses on a new chaos-based image encryption scheme pro-
posed by Chen and Yen in [19,20], which was originally called RSES (random
seed encryption system) in [19] and then renamed to be RCES (random con-
trol encryption system) in [20]. RCES can be considered as an enhanced ver-
sion of a previously-proposed image encryption scheme called CKBA (chaotic
key-based algorithm) [18], which has been cryptanalyzed in [28]. The present
paper evaluates the security of RCES, and points out that RCES is as weak
as CKBA, though it seems more complicated than CKBA. In known/chosen-
plaintext attack, only one or two known/chosen plain-images are enough to
break this image encryption scheme. In addition, we also show that the secu-
rity of RCES against brute-force attack was much overestimated by Chen and
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Yen in [19,20].
Due to the special design of RCES, some of its essential security defects are
very useful for revealing several general principles of designing secure image
encryption schemes. This magnifies the cryptanalysis presented below, though
RCES is not a very delicate cipher from the cryptographical point of view.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces RCES and its
parent version CKBA. A detailed cryptanalysis of RCES is presented in Sec. 3,
where some experimental results are given to support the theoretical analysis.
Section 4 discusses some design principles drawn from the essential security
defects of RCES. The last section concludes the paper.
2 Introduction to RCES
2.1 CKBA [18] - The Parent Version of RCES
Assume that the size of the plain-image for encryption is M × N 1 , CKBA
can be described as follows.
2.1.1 The secret key
The secret key includes two bytes key1, key2, and the initial condition x(0) ∈
(0, 1) of the following chaotic Logistic map:
x(n+ 1) = µ · x(n) · (1− x(n)), (1)
which is a well-studied chaotic system in chaos theory and behaves chaotically
when µ > 3.5699 · · · [37].
2.1.2 Initialization
Run the chaotic system to generate a chaotic sequence, {x(i)}dMN/8e−1i=0 , where
dae denotes the smallest integer that is not less than a. From the 16-bit binary
representation of x(i) = 0.b(16i+ 0)b(16i+ 1) · · · b(16i+ 15), derive a pseudo-
random binary sequence (PRBS), {b(i)}2MN−1i=0 .
1 In this paper, M ×N is in the form “width×height”.
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2.1.3 Encryption
For the plain-pixel f(x, y) (0 ≤ x ≤M −1, 0 ≤ y ≤ N −1), the corresponding
cipher-pixel f ′(x, y) = f
′
(x, y) is determined by the following rule:
f ′(x, y) =

f(x, y)⊕ key1, B(x, y) = 3,
f(x, y) key1, B(x, y) = 2,
f(x, y)⊕ key2, B(x, y) = 1,
f(x, y) key2, B(x, y) = 0,
(2)
where B(x, y) = 2 × b(x × N + y) + b(x × N + y + 1), and ⊕ and  denote
XOR and XNOR operations, respectively. Since a  b = a⊕ b = a ⊕ b¯, the
above equation is equivalent to
f ′(x, y) =

f(x, y)⊕ key1, B(x, y) = 3,
f(x, y)⊕ key1, B(x, y) = 2,
f(x, y)⊕ key2, B(x, y) = 1,
f(x, y)⊕ key2, B(x, y) = 0.
(3)
2.1.4 Decryption
The decryption procedure is like that of the encryption, since⊕ is an involutive
operation 2 .
2.1.5 A constraint
Because not all values of key1 and key2 can make well-disorderly cipher-
images, it is required that key1 and key2 have 4 different bits (a half of all).
In fact, this constraint ensures that the encryption results of key1 and key2
are sufficiently far.
In [28], CKBA was cryptanalyzed and the following facts were pointed out:
• the security of CKBA against the brute-force attack was over-estimated;
• CKBA is not secure against known/chosen-plaintext attacks, since only one
known/chosen plain-image is enough to get an equivalent key, a mask image
fm, by XORing the plain-image f and the cipher-image f
′, pixel by pixel:
fm = f ⊕ f ′;
• it is easy to reconstruct the whole secret key {key1, key2, x(0)} from the
mask image fm, for which the required complexity is rather small.
2 An involutive encryption operation satisfies f(f(x, k), k) = x for any x and k.
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Apparently, the insecurity of CKBA against known/chosen-plaintext attacks
is determined by the fact that f(x, y)⊕ f ′(x, y) is fixed to be one of the four
values, key1, key1, key2, key2, at any given position (x, y). In fact, for any
plain-images, f1, f2 and their cipher-images, f
′
1, f
′
2, one has
f1(x, y)⊕ f ′1(x, y) = f2(x, y)⊕ f ′2(x, y) ≡ fm(x, y)
for any position (x, y). As a result, given any cipher-image f ′, the plain-image
can be decrypted as follows: f = f ′ ⊕ fm.
2.2 RCES [20] (or RSES [19])
RCES is an enhanced version of CKBA, by making key1 and key2 time-
variant, and by introducing a simple permutation operation, Swapb(x1, x2),
which exchanges the values of x1 and x2 if b = 1 and does nothing if b = 0.
RCES encrypts plain-images block by block, where each block contains 16
consecutive pixels. To simplify the following description, without loss of gen-
erality, assume that the sizes of plain-images are all M × N , and that MN
can be divided by 16. Consider a plain-image {f(x, y)}x=M−1,y=N−1x=0,y=0 as a 1-D
pixel-sequence {f(l)}MN−1l=0 by scanning it line by line from bottom to top. The
plain-image can be divided into MN/16 blocks:
{f (16)(0), · · · , f (16)(k), · · · , f (16)(MN/16− 1)},
where
f (16)(k) = {f(16k + 0), · · · , f(16k + i), · · · , f(16k + 15)} .
For the k-th pixel-block f (16)(k), the work mechanism of RCES can be de-
scribed as follows.
2.2.1 The secret key
The secret key includes the control parameter µ and the initial condition x(0)
of the Logistic map (1).
2.2.2 Initialization
Run the Logistic map to generate a chaotic sequence, {x(i)}MN/16−1i=0 , and then
extract the 24-bit representation of x(i) to yield a PRBS {b(i)}3MN/2−1i=0 . Note
that the Logistic map is realized in 24-bit fixed-point arithmetic.
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2.2.3 Encryption
Two pseudo-random seeds,
Seed1(k) =
7∑
i=0
b(24k + i)× 27−i, (4)
Seed2(k) =
7∑
i=0
b(24k + 8 + i)× 27−i, (5)
are calculated to encrypt the current plain-block with the following two steps:
• Step 1 – Pseudo-randomly swapping adjacent pixels : for i = 0 ∼ 7, do
Swapb(24k+16+i)(f(16k + 2i), f(16k + 2i+ 1)). (6)
• Step 2 – Masking the current plain-block with the two pseudo-random seeds :
for j = 0 ∼ 15, do
f ′(16k + j) = f(16k + j)⊕ Seed(16k + j), (7)
where
Seed(16k + j) =

Seed1(k), B(k, j) = 3,
Seed1(k), B(k, j) = 2,
Seed2(k), B(k, j) = 1,
Seed2(k), B(k, j) = 0,
(8)
and B(k, j) = 2× b(24k + j) + b(24k + j + 1).
2.2.4 Decryption
The decryption procedure is similar to the encryption procedure, but the
masking operation is exerted before the swapping for each pixel-block.
3 Cryptanalysis of RCES
Although RCES is more complicated than CKBA, as analyzed below, its se-
curity is not really enhanced by the introduced design complexity.
In this section, the following results are obtained on the security of RCES: 1)
its security against brute-force attack was over-estimated; 2) it is not secure
against known/chosen-plaintext attacks, and the number of required plain-
images is only O(1) and, in fact, only one or two; 3) there are two available
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known/chosen-plaintext attacks, and they can be further combined to make
a nearly-perfect attack to RCES; 4) the chosen-plaintext attacks can even
achieve much better breaking performance than their known-plaintext ver-
sions.
3.1 The Brute-Force Attack
In [19,20], Chen and Yen claimed that the complexity of RCES against brute-
force attack is O
(
23MN/2
)
since {b(i)}3MN/2−1i=0 has 3MN/2 bits. However,
such a statement is not true due to the following reason: all 3MN/2 bits are
uniquely determined by the control parameter µ and the initial condition x(0)
of the Logistic map (1), which has only 48 secret bits. This means that the
key entropy of RCES is only 48. Considering not all values of µ can produce
chaoticity in the Logistic map, the key entropy should be even smaller than
48. To simplify the following analysis, assume that the key entropy is Kµ < 48,
so the total number of all possible keys for brute-force search is only 2Kµ .
Considering that the complexity of RCES is O(MN) [20, Sec. 2.4], the com-
plexity against the brute-force attack will be O
(
2Kµ ·MN
)
. Assume Kµ = 48,
for a typical image whose size is 256 × 256, the complexity is about O (264),
which is much smaller than O
(
23MN/2
)
= O (298304), the claimed complexity
in [19, 20]. Apparently, the security of RCES against the brute-force attack
was over-estimated too much.
Note that one has to find a way to automatically verify the guessed keys,
in the case that the attacker does not know any plain-image. This can be
done by calculating the distribution of the differences of adjacent pixels. For
a wrong key, the obtained image is generally chaotic-like, and the distribution
of the pixel-value difference would be nearly uniform. For the correct key, a
natural image will be output, which corresponds to a Laplacian distribution
of the neighboring differences. Note that the complexity of such a verification
process is also O(MN).
3.2 Known-Plaintext Attack 1: Breaking RCES with a Mask Image fm
Although different seeds are used for pixels at different positions and pseudo-
random swapping operations are exerted on the plain-image before masking,
the known-plaintext attack breaking CKBA can be efficiently extended to
break RCES. With only one known plain-image and its corresponding cipher-
image, it is very easy to get a mask image fm, which can be used as an
equivalent key of the secret key (µ, x(0)) to decrypt any cipher-image whose
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size is not larger than the size of fm. When two or more plain-images are
known, a swapping matrix Q can be constructed to enhance the breaking
performance of the mask image fm.
3.2.1 Get fm from One Known Plain-Image
Assume that an M × N plain-image fK and its corresponding cipher-image
f ′K have been known to an attacker. Similar to the way to get the mask
image in the known-plaintext attack to CKBA, the attacker here can get
fm by simply XORing the plain-image and the cipher-image pixel by pixel:
fm(l) = fK(l)⊕ f ′K(l), where l = 0 ∼MN − 1.
With the mask image fm, the attacker tries to recover the plain-image by
XORing the mask image and the cipher-image pixel by pixel: f(l) = f ′(l) ⊕
fm(l). If a pixel f(l) is not swapped, f(l) = f
′(l) ⊕ fm(l) holds; otherwise,
f(l) = f ′(l)⊕ fm(l) is generally not true. Assume that the bit b(24k + 16 + i)
in Eq. (6) satisfies the balanced distribution 3 over {0, 1}, it is expected that
about half of all plain-pixels are not swapped and can be successfully decrypted
with fm ⊕ f ′. Intuitively, half of plain-pixels should be enough to reveal the
main content and some details of the plain-image.
With the secret key (µ, x(0)) = (3.915264, 0.2526438), which is randomly cho-
sen with the standard rand() function, some experiments are made to show
the real performance of the mask image fm in this attack. One known plain-
image fLenna and its cipher-image f
′
Lenna are shown in Fig. 1. The mask image
fm = fLenna ⊕ f ′Lenna is given in Fig. 2. For an unknown plain-image fPeppers
(Fig. 3a), the mask image fm is used to recover it from its cipher-image f
′
Peppers
(Fig. 3b). The recovered plain-image f ∗Peppers = fm ⊕ f ′Peppers and the recovery
error
∣∣∣f ∗Peppers − fPeppers∣∣∣ are shown in Fig. 4a and 4b, respectively. It is sur-
prisingly seen that the decryption performance is much better than expected:
most (much more than 50%) pixels are successfully recovered, and almost all
subtle details remain.
Although the recovery error
∣∣∣f ∗Peppers − fPeppers∣∣∣ visually shows that most plain-
pixels are exactly recovered, statistical data reveal that 33,834 pixels in f ∗Peppers−
fPeppers are not zero, i.e., about 51.63% of pixels are not exactly recovered.
To explain why fm is so effective to recover most pixels of the plain-image
with only half exactly-recovered pixels, consider two pixels in the known
plain-image, f(2i), f(2i+ 1), and their cipher-pixels, f ′(2i), f ′(2i+ 1), where
i = 0 ∼ MN/2 − 1. Then, the corresponding elements of the two pixels
in the mask image fm will be fm(2i) = f(2i) ⊕ f ′(2i) and fm(2i + 1) =
3 Strictly speaking, the Logistic map cannot guarantee the balance of each gener-
ated bit, since its variant density function is not uniform [38]. In this paper, without
loss of generality, it is taken for granted so as to simplify the theoretical analyses.
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a) fLenna b) f
′
Lenna
Fig. 1. One 256× 256 known plain-image, fLenna, and its cipher-image f ′Lenna.
Fig. 2. The mask image fm derived from fLenna and f
′
Lenna.
a) fPeppers b) f
′
Peppers
Fig. 3. A 256×256 plain-image unknown to the attacker, fPeppers, and its cipher-im-
age f ′Peppers.
f(2i + 1) ⊕ f ′(2i + 1). Since all recovery errors are introduced at the posi-
tions where the adjacent plain-pixels are swapped, one can theoretically study
the recovery performance of the mask image fm by considering the elements
corresponding to the swapped pixels only. Assume that f(2i) and f(2i + 1)
are swapped in the encryption procedure, f ′(2i) = f(2i + 1) ⊕ Seed(2i) and
f ′(2i+ 1) = f(2i)⊕ Seed(2i+ 1). Therefore,
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a) f∗Peppers b)
∣∣∣f∗Peppers − fPeppers∣∣∣
Fig. 4. The result of breaking the plain-image with fm derived from fLenna: a) the
recovered plain-image f∗Peppers; b) the recovery error
∣∣∣f∗Peppers − fPeppers∣∣∣.
fm(2i) = f
(⊕)(2i)⊕ Seed(2i), (9)
fm(2i+ 1) = f
(⊕)(2i)⊕ Seed(2i+ 1), (10)
where f (⊕)(2i) = f(2i)⊕ f(2i+ 1).
Consider a cipher-image f ′1 and its corresponding plain-image f1. Assuming
that the plain-image recovered from fm is f
∗
1 , the recovered plain-pixels, f
∗
1 (2i)
and f ∗1 (2i + 1), satisfy the following propositions and corollaries. Note that
these results are only true for swapped pixels.
Proposition 1 f ∗1 (2i)⊕f1(2i) = f ∗1 (2i+ 1)⊕f1(2i+ 1) = f (⊕)(2i)⊕f (⊕)1 (2i).
Proof : From Eq. (9) and f ′1(2i) = f1(2i+ 1)⊕ Seed(2i),
f ∗1 (2i) = fm(2i)⊕ f ′1(2i),
=
(
f (⊕)(2i)⊕ Seed(2i)
)
⊕ (f1(2i+ 1)⊕ Seed(2i))
= f (⊕)(2i)⊕ f1(2i+ 1)
Then, one has
f ∗1 (2i)⊕ f1(2i) = f (⊕)(2i)⊕ f1(2i+ 1)⊕ f1(2i)
= f (⊕)(2i)⊕ f (⊕)1 (2i).
In a similar way, one can get f ∗1 (2i + 1) ⊕ f1(2i + 1) = f (⊕)(2i) ⊕ f (⊕)1 (2i).
Thus, the proof is completed. 
Corollary 1 When f(2i) = f(2i + 1), f ∗1 (2i) = f1(2i + 1) and f
∗
1 (2i + 1) =
f1(2i).
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Proof : The results of this corollary are special cases of the above two propo-
sitions with f (⊕)(2i) = 0. 
Based on the above propositions, one can get an upper bound of the recovery
errors |f ∗1 (2i) − f1(2i)| and |f ∗1 (2i + 1) − f1(2i + 1)|. Firstly, a lemma should
be introduced.
Lemma 1 If a⊕ b = c, then |a− b| ≤ c.
Proof : Represent c in the following binary form:
c = (0, · · · , 0, cn−1 = 1, · · · , ci, · · · , c1, c0)2.
Similarly, represent a and b as follows:
a= (aN−1, · · · , an−1, · · · , ai, · · · , a1, a0)2,
b= (bN−1, · · · , bn−1, · · · , bi, · · · , b1, b0)2.
From a⊕ b = c, one have ∀j = n ∼ N − 1, aj = bj. Therefore,
|a− b|=
∣∣∣∣∣
N−1∑
i=0
(ai − bi) · 2i
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
n−1∑
i=0
(ai − bi) · 2i
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
n−1∑
i=0
|ai − bi| · 2i.
Since |ai − bi| = ai ⊕ bi = ci, one has |a− b| ≤ ∑n−1i=0 ci · 2i = c. The lemma is
thus proved. 
Corollary 2 |f ∗1 (2i)− f1(2i)| ≤ f (⊕)(2i)⊕ f (⊕)1 (2i), and |f ∗1 (2i+ 1)− f1(2i+
1)| ≤ f (⊕)(2i)⊕ f (⊕)1 (2i).
Proof : This corollary is an obvious result of Proposition 1 and Lemma 1. 
Corollary 2 says that the recovery errors of both f ∗1 (2i) and f
∗
1 (2i+1) will not
be larger than f (⊕)(2i) ⊕ f (⊕)1 (2i) = f(2i) ⊕ f(2i + 1) ⊕ f1(2i) ⊕ f1(2i + 1).
Due to the strong correlation between adjacent pixels of digital images, the
distribution of the difference between two adjacent pixels is Gaussian-like. As
a result, f (⊕)(2i) will also obeys a (positive) single-side Gaussian-like distribu-
tion, which means that the recovery error of each plain-pixel recovered from
fm will also obey a Gaussian-like distribution. The Gaussian-like distribution
of recovery errors actually implies that most recovered pixels are close to the
real values of the original plain-pixels. Therefore, the surprising recovery per-
formance of fm shown in Fig. 4 can be naturally explained.
11
For the plain-image fPeppers, the histograms of some differential images are
plotted to verify the above-mentioned theoretical results. Define two (M −
1)×N differential images f (−) and f (⊕):
f (−)(x, y) = f(x, y)− f(x+ 1, y), (11)
f (⊕)(x, y) = f(x, y)⊕ f(x+ 1, y), (12)
where x = 0 ∼M − 2, y = 0 ∼ N . The histograms of the above two differen-
tial images of fPeppers are shown in Fig. 5. When f = fLenna, f1 = fPeppers, the
histograms of f (⊕) ⊕ f (⊕)1 and
∣∣∣f ∗Peppers − fPeppers∣∣∣ are shown in Fig. 6. Appar-
ently, Figure 6 agrees with Corollary 2 very well. Note that only the swapped
pixels are enumerated for the histogram of
∣∣∣f ∗Peppers − fPeppers∣∣∣, since the above
theoretical analysis on the recovery errors is only focused on the swapped
pixels.
−255 −200 −150 −100 −50 0 50 100 150 200 255
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2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
- - -: f
(−)
Peppers
—–: f
(⊕)
Peppers
Fig. 5. The histograms of f
(−)
Peppers and f
(⊕)
Peppers.
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∣∣∣f∗Peppers − fPeppers∣∣∣
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(⊕)
Lenna ⊕ f (⊕)Peppers
Fig. 6. The histograms of f
(⊕)
Lenna ⊕ f (⊕)Peppers and
∣∣∣f∗Peppers − fPeppers∣∣∣.
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Since all recovery errors are introduced by swapped pixels, the recovery per-
formance will be better if some swapped pixels can be distinguished. In the
following, it is shown that an attacker can manage to do so by manually detect-
ing visible noises in cipher-images, and by intersecting multiple mask images
generated from different known plain-images.
3.2.2 Amending fm with More Known Cipher-Images
Assume that the corresponding plain-image of a cipher-image does not con-
tain salt-pepper impulsive noises. Then, one can assert that all such noises in
the recovered plain-image indicates the positions of swapped pixels. Observ-
ing the recovered plain-image f ∗Peppers shown in Fig. 4a, one can find many
distinguishable noises by naked eyes, which correspond to the strong edges of
the known plain-image fPeppers (see Fig. 4b). Following Proposition 1, strong
edges means large values of f (⊕)(x), and so generates salt-pepper noises.
Once some swapped pixels are distinguished, one can generate a swapping
(0, 1)-matrix Q = [qi,j]M×N , where qi,j = 1 for swapped pixels and qi,j = 0
for others. Similarly, Q can be represented in 1-D form: Q = {q(l)}MN−1i=0 .
With the swapping matrix, the mask image fm is amended as follows: for
i = 0 ∼ MN/2 − 1, if q(2i) = 1 or q(2i + 1) = 1, the values of fm(2i)
and fm(2i + 1) are re-calculated as follows: fm(2i) = f(2i) ⊕ f ′(2i + 1) and
fm(2i + 1) = f(2i + 1) ⊕ f ′(2i); otherwise, fm(2i) and fm(2i + 1) are left
untouched. With the amended fm and the swapping matrix Q, one can decrypt
the cipher-images in the following two steps:
• use fm to XOR the cipher-image to get an initial recovered plain-image f ∗;
• ∀i = 0 ∼ MN/2 − 1, if q(2i) = 1 or q(2i + 1) = 1, swap the two adjacent
pixels f ∗(2i) and f ∗(2i+ 1).
If an attacker can get more cipher-images encrypted with the same key, he
can distinguish more swapped pixels, and gets better recovery performance
with fm and Q. This implies that more and more knowledge on how to purify
the attack can be learned from the cipher-images, which is a desirable feature
from an attacker’s point of view.
3.2.3 Amending fm with More Known Plain-Images
With two or more known plain-images and their cipher-images encrypted with
the same secret key, it is possible to successfully distinguish most swapped
pixels, achieving nearly perfect recovery performance. Given n ≥ 2 known
plain-images, f1, · · · , fn, and their cipher-images, f ′1, · · · , f ′n, one can get n
mask images f (i)m = fi ⊕ f ′i (i = 1 ∼ n). Apparently, if the l-th pixel is
not swapped, ∀i 6= j, f (i)m (l) = f (j)m (l). That is, if f (i)m (l) 6= f (j)m (l), it can be
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asserted that the pixel at this position is swapped. Therefore, by comparing
the elements of n mask images, some positions corresponding to the swapped
pixels can be distinguished. With the swapping information, following the
same way described above, a swapping matrix Q can be constructed, and then
fm is amended with Q with the way mentioned above. Using the amended fm
and the swapping matrix Q, the cipher-image is decrypted with XOR and
swapping operations.
From Eqs. (9) and (10), the probability of f (i)m (l) 6= f (j)m (l) is the probability
of f
(⊕)
i (2i) 6= f (⊕)j (2i), where l = 2i or 2i+ 1. Assume the n mask images are
independent of each other and the value of each element distributes uniformly
over {0, · · · , 255}. The probability of f (i)m (l) 6= f (j)m (l) will be 1−256−1 ≈ 0.996.
This means that only two mask images are enough to distinguish almost all
swapped pixels. However, since the mask images are generally not independent
of each other and fm(l) does not obey uniform distribution, the real proba-
bility will be less than 1 − 256−1. Fortunately, for most natural images, this
probability is still sufficiently close to 1 − 256−1, so that two known plain-
images are still enough to distinguish most swapped pixels. Given two known
plain-images, fLenna (Fig. 1a) and fBarbara (Fig. 7a), the recovery performance
of the attack corresponding to fPeppers is shown in Fig. 7b. It can be seen that
the recovered plain-image is almost perfect, and only 952 (about 1.45% of all)
pixels are not exactly recovered.
a) fBarbara b) f
∗∗
Peppers
Fig. 7. Another known plain-image fBarbara and the recovered plain-image f
∗∗
Peppers
with two known plain-images: fLenna and fBarbara.
3.2.4 Enhancing the Recovered Plain-Image with Image Processing Tech-
niques
To further improve the visual quality of the recovered plain-images, some
noise reducing techniques can be used to further reduce the recovery er-
rors. For the recovered plain-image f ∗Peppers in Fig. 4a, the enhanced plain-
image f ∗,3×3Peppers with a 3× 3 median filter and the corresponding recovery error
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∣∣∣f ∗,3×3Peppers − fPeppers∣∣∣ are shown in Fig. 8a and 8b, respectively. It can be seen
that the visual quality of f ∗Peppers is enhanced significantly. Note that more
complicated image processing techniques are still available to further polish
the recovered plain-image, one of which will be introduced below in Sec. 3.5.
a) f∗,3×3Peppers b)
∣∣∣f∗,3×3Peppers − fPeppers∣∣∣
Fig. 8. The result of enhancing the recovered plain-image f∗Peppers with a 3×3 median
filter: a) the enhanced image f∗,3×3Peppers; b) the recovery error
∣∣∣f∗,3×3Peppers − fPeppers∣∣∣.
3.3 Known-Plaintext Attack 2: Breaking the Chaotic Map
In the above-discussed attack based on mask images, assuming that the size
of fm is M × N , it is obvious that only M × N leading pixels in a larger
cipher-image can be recovered with fm (and perhaps Q). To decrypt more
pixels, the secret control parameter µ and a chaotic state x(k) occurring before
x(MN/16−1) have to be known, so that one can calculate more chaotic states
after x(MN/16 − 1). That is, the chaotic map should be found. Actually, it
is possible for an attacker to achieve this goal with a high probability and
a sufficiently small complexity, even when only one plain-image is known.
Similarly, the more the number of known plain-images are, the closer the
probability will be to 1, the smaller the value of k will be, and the lower the
attack complexity will be.
3.3.1 Guessing a Chaotic State x(k) from fm
In the k-th pixel-block, for any unswapped pixel f(16k + j),
fm(16k + j) = f(16k + j)⊕ f ′(16k + j) = Seed(16k + j),
which must be one value in the set
S4 =
{
Seed1(k), Seed1(k), Seed2(k), Seed2(k)
}
. (13)
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Therefore, if there are enough unswapped pixels, the right values of Seed1(k)
and Seed2(k) can be guessed by enumerating all 2-value and 1-value 4 com-
binations of fm(16k + 0) ∼ fm(16k + 15). To eliminate most wrong values of
Seed1(k), Seed2(k), the following requirements are useful:
• both B(k, j) and (Seed1(k), Seed2(k)) are generated with {b(24k + j}15j=0;
• Seed(16k + j) is uniquely determined by B(k, j) and Seed1(k), Seed2(k)
following Eq. (8).
For each guessed values passing the above requirements, the corresponding
chaotic state x(k) = 0.b(24k + 0) · · · b(24k + 23) is derived as follows:
• reconstruct {b(24k + i)}15i=0 from Seed1(k), Seed2(k);
• reconstruct {b(24k+16+i)}7i=0 with the following rule: if both fm(16k+2i) ∈
S4 and fm(16k+2i+1) ∈ S4 hold, b(24k+16+i) = 0, else b(24k+16+i) = 1.
Note that some extra errors will be introduced in the least 8 bits {b(24k +
16 + i)}7i=0, which makes the derived chaotic state x(k) incorrect. Apparently,
the errors are induced by the swapped pixels whose corresponding elements
of fm belong to S4. In the following, the probability of such errors, pse =
Prob [fm(l) ∈ S4], is studied. For any swapped pixel f(l) in the k-th pixel-
block (l = 16k + 0 ∼ 16k + 15), according to Eqs. (9) and (10), one has
pse = Prob
[
f (⊕)(l) ∈ S(⊕)4
]
, (14)
where f (⊕)(l) = f (2bl/2c)⊕ f (2bl/2c+ 1) and
S
(⊕)
4 =
{
Seed1(k)⊕ Seed(l), Seed1(k)⊕ Seed(l),
Seed2(k)⊕ Seed(l), Seed2(k)⊕ Seed(l)
}
.
Considering the Gaussian-like distribution of f (⊕) (see Fig. 5) and the fact
that 0 ∈ S(⊕)4 , pse is generally not negligible for natural images. Without loss
of generality, assume that each bit in {b(i)} yields a balanced distribution over
{0, 1} and any two bits are independent of each other. One can deduce
P1 = Prob[x(k) is correct] =
8∑
i=0
pb(8, i) · pic, (15)
where pb(8, i) =
(
8
i
)
· 2−8, which denotes the probability that there are i pairs
of swapped pixels, and pc = 1 − pse. The relation between P1 and pc is given
in Fig. 9.
4 The 1-value combinations are included since Seed1(k) = Seed2(k) may occur
with a small probability.
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Fig. 11. Prob[x(k) is correct] vs. pc
Considering the Gaussian-like distribution of f (⊕) (see Fig. 6)
and 0 ∈ S(⊕)4 , this probability is generally not negligible for
natural images. Assume that each bit in {b(i)} yields balanced
distribute over {0, 1}, we have
Prob[x(k) is correct] =
8∑
i=0
pw(i) · pic,
where pw(i) = Prob[there are i pairs of swapped pixels] =(
8
i
) · 2−8 and pc = 1 − Prob[fm(16k + j) ∈ S4]. The
relationship between Prob[x(k) is correct] and pc is given in
Fig. 11.
2) Deriving µ from two consecutive chaotic states: With
two consecutive chaotic states x(k) and x(k + 1), the es-
timated value of the secret control parameter µ will be
µ˜k =
x(k + 1)
x(k) · (1− x(k)) . Due to the negative influence of
quantization errors, generally µ˜k 6= µ. As known, chaotic
maps are sensitive to noises in the initial condition, so an
approximate value of µ will generate entirely different chaotic
states after several iterations, which implies µ˜k can not be
directly used instead of µ as the secret key. Fortunately, if
|µ˜k − µ| is small enough, we can exhaustively search the
neighborhood of µ˜k to find the right value of µ.
Now let us study when |µ˜k − µ| will be small enough.
3) Search algorithm 1: Note that Seed1(k) = Seed2(k) is
possible, so the search complexity should be
(
16
2
)
+
(
16
1
)
= 136.
4) Search algorithm 2: Note that Seed1(k) = Seed2(k) is
possible, which should be considered to search the secret key.
D. The Combined Known-Plaintext Attack
E. The Chosen-Plaintext Attack
In the above discussion on known-plaintext attacks, we have
mentioned some requirements of the known plain-images. By
choosing only one plain-image satisfying the requirements,
one can get the mask image fm, and the equivalent key
{µ, x(i)} without more plain-images.
V. EXPERIMENTS
VI. HOW TO IMPROVE RCES?
In above sections, we have shown RCES image encryp-
tion method is not secure enough to ciphertext-only, known-
plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks, from both theoretical
and experimental viewpoints. In this section, we will study
some remedies to RCES and their performance of improving
the security of RCES.
To sum up, it is easy to enhance the security of RCES to
ciphertext-only attack, but it is rather difficult to essentially
enhance the security to known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext
attacks. In fact, the essential reason of the above known-
plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks is the encryption pro-
cedure of RCES . But if we change the encryption procedure,
RCES will become an entirely different encryption scheme.
VII. SOME DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF IMAGE ENCRYPTION
ddd.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we point out that the RCES image encryption
method proposed in [18] is not secure enough to the ciphertext-
only, known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attack. Detailed
cryptanalytic investigations are given and some experiments
are made to verify the feasibility of the known/chosen-
plaintext attack. We also discuss some remedies to the original
scheme and their performance, but none of them can essen-
tially improve the security of RCES. We suggest not using
RCES in any strict applications, except when it can be ensured
that any secret key will never been used repeatedly to encrypt
more than one plain-images.
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Fig. 9. The relationship between P1 = Prob[x(k) is correct] and pc.
3.3.2 Deriving µ from Two Consecutive Chaotic States
With two consecutive chaotic states, x(k) and x(k + 1), the estimated value
of the secret control parameter µ will be µ˜k =
x(k + 1)
x(k) · (1− x(k)) . Due to the
negative influence of quantization errors, generally µ˜k 6= µ. As known, chaotic
maps are sensitive to noise in the initial condition, so an approximate value
of µ will generate completely different chaotic states after several iterations,
which implies that µ˜k can not be directly used inste d of µ as the secret key.
Fortunately, if |µ˜k − µ| is small enough, one can exhaustively search in the
neighborhood of µ˜k to find the right value of µ. To verify which guessed value
of µ is the right one, one should iterate the Logistic map from x(k + 1) until
x(MN/16− 1), and then check whether or not the corresponding elements in
fm match the calculated chaotic states. Once a mismatch occurs, the current
guessed value is discarded, and the next guess will be tried. To minimize
the verification complexity, one can check only a number of chaotic states
sufficiently far from x(k + 1) to eliminate most (or even all) wrong values of
µ˜k, and verify the left few ones by checking all ch otic states from x(k+ 2) to
x(MN/16− 1).
Now, the concern is when |µ˜k−µ| will be small enough t make the exhaustive
search practical. According to Proposition 2 (see the App ndix for a proof),
when x(k+ 1) ≥ 2−n, the quantization e ror of µ˜k is less than 2n+3/2L, which
means that the siz of the neig borhood of µ˜k for exhaustive search is 2
n+3.
To make the search complexity practically small in real attacks, x(k+1) ≥ 0.5
is suggested to derive µ, which occurs with probability 0.5.
Proposition 2 Assume that the Logistic map x(k + 1) = µ · x(k) · (1− x(k))
is iterated with L-bit fixed-point arithmetic and that x(k + 1) ≥ 2−n, where
1 ≤ n ≤ L. Then, the following inequality holds: |µ − µ˜k| ≤ 2n+3/2L, where
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µ˜k =
x(k + 1)
x(k) · (1− x(k)) .
Combining the above analyses, the final complexity of finding two correct
consecutive chaotic states, x(k), x(k + 1), and the right value of µ, is
O
2×
((
16
2
)
+
(
16
1
))
(0.5× P1)2 × 2
1+3
 = O(17408
P 21
)
, (16)
which is generally much smaller than the complexity of exhaustively searching
all possible keys. As a reference value, when pc = 0.7, the complexity is about
O (217.8) O (248).
3.3.3 A Quick Algorithm to Guess the Two Random Seeds
Following the above-discussed search process, the found correct chaotic states
x(k) and x(k + 1) will be close to x(0). Considering the occurrence of two
consecutive chaotic states larger than 0.5 as a Bernoulli experiment, the math-
ematical expectation of k will be
1
(0.5× P1)2 =
4
P 21
[39]. This means that only
tens of known plain-pixels 5 are enough for an attacker to break the chaotic
map, which is a very desired feature for attackers. However, as an obvious dis-
advantage, the search complexity to guess the two random seeds is somewhat
large. In fact, for each pixel-block, one can only test a few number of possible
2-value (and 1-value) combinations, not all. Fortunately, we have another idea
to make the search easier: if this pixel-block looks not good for guessing the
two random seeds, simply discard it and go to the next pixel-block. Following
such an idea, a quicker algorithm can be designed to find the two random
seeds. In this quick-search algorithm, the found correct chaotic states x(k)
and x(k + 1) may be far from x(0), so the size of the mask image has to be
much larger than
4
P 21
.
The quick-search algorithm is based on the following observation: the more
the unswapped pixels there are in the k-th pixel-block, the more elements in
{fm(16k+j)}15j=0 belong to S4. Then, define a new sequence
{
f˜m(16k + j)
}15
j=0
accordingly as follows:
f˜m(16k + j) = min
(
fm(16k + j), fm(16k + j)
)
. (17)
Then, the following is also true: the more the unswapped pixels there are
in the k-th pixel-block, the more the number of the values in S2 will be in
5 For example, even a 10× 10 “tiny” image is enough.
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{
f˜m(16k + j)
}15
j=0
, where
S2 =
{
min
(
Seed1(k), Seed1(k)
)
,min
(
Seed2(k), Seed2(k)
)}
.
Therefore, assuming that there are nk pairs of unswapped pixels in the k-
th pixel-block, the following fact is true: if nk is sufficiently large, the two
most-occurring elements in
{
f˜m(16k + j)
}15
j=0
are the two values in S2, with
a high probability. Then, the question becomes: when can one say that nk
is sufficiently large? In totally 8 pairs of elements, the average number of
pairs in S2 is N(S2) = nk + (8 − nk) · pse, and the number of other pairs
is N(S2) = 8 − N(S2) = (8 − nk) · (1 − pse). From a conservative point of
view, let N(S2) <
N(S2)
2
, which ensures that the occurring probability of
each element of S2 is larger than the probability of all other values, with
a sufficiently high probability. Solving this inequality, one can get nk ≥ 6,
yielding N(S2) ≤ 2 < 3 ≤ N(S2)
2
.
Based on the above analyses, the quick-search algorithm is described as follows:
• Step 1 : for each pixel-block, generate a new sequence,
{
f˜m(16k + j)
}15
j=0
;
• Step 2 : rank all values of
{
f˜m(16k + j)
}15
j=0
to find the top two mostly-
occurring values, value1 and value2;
• Step 3 : if the occurrence times of value1 and value2 is not less than 12, or
if the occurrence times of value2 is less than 3, skip the current pixel-block
and goto Step 1 ;
• Step 4 : in the set S˜4 =
{
value1, value1, value2, value2
}
, exhaustively search
Seed1(k) and Seed2(k).
If more than one value corresponds to the same position in the rank of{
f˜m(16k + j)
}15
j=0
, all of them should be enumerated as value1 and value2
in Step 2 to Step 4. In a real attack, some extra constraints, such as the rela-
tion between the random seeds and B(k, j) (which is due to the reuse of some
chaotic bits), can be added to further optimize the above algorithm for differ-
ent mask images. The attack complexity of this quick-search algorithm is hard
to theoretically analyzed, since the distribution of those values that are not in
S4 is generally unknown. Fortunately, experiments show that the complexity
is much smaller than the one given above. In Fig. 10, the performance of the
quick-search algorithm is shown for the recovered plain-image f ∗Peppers, where
different pixel-blocks are used to extract the chaotic states. Note that more
than forty pixel-blocks are eligible to be used to extract the correct chaotic
states, and the three shown here are randomly chosen for demonstration.
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a) The recovered
plain-image f∗Peppers from the
7th pixel-block
b) The recovered
plain-image f∗Peppers from the
689th pixel-block
c) The recovered plain-image
f∗Peppers from the 1673rd
pixel-block
d) Recovering a larger
plain-image f∗Peppers2,768×768
from the 1673rd pixel-block
Fig. 10. Demonstration of the quick-search algorithm, where fLenna is the only known
plain-image.
In the following, it is theoretically studied as how much MN should be to
guarantee the efficiency of the quick-search algorithm, which is determined
by the occurrence probability that two consecutive pixel-blocks satisfy the
requirements given in Step 1 and Step 3. Assume that each bit in {b(i)} yields
a balanced distribution over {0, 1} and any two bits are independent of each
other. The probability that one pixel-block satisfies the requirements, which
is denoted by Po, yields Eq. (18). Then, for the occurrence probability that
two consecutive pixel-blocks satisfy the requirements, which is denoted by Po2,
one can calculate that Po2 = P
2
o ≥ Prob
[
S4 = S˜4
]2
=
(
4699
215
)2
≈ 0.02. This
means that there will be two consecutive pixel-blocks satisfy the requirements
in
1
Po2
≈ 50 pixel-blocks (about 800 pixels), from the probabilistic point of
view. Therefore, the required size of the known plain-image should be larger
than 800, which is even smaller than the size of a 30 × 30 image. Hence, the
quick-search algorithm is very efficient to use for attacks.
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Po≥Prob
[
S4 = S˜4
]
=Prob
[
both Seed1(k) and Seed2(k) occur ≥ 3 times in
{
f˜m(16k + j)
}15
j=0
]
· Prob
[
min
(
Seed1(k), Seed1(k)
)
6= min
(
Seed2(k), Seed2(k)
)]
=
8∑
nk=6
((
8
nk
)
· 2−8 ·
(
1−
2∑
m=0
(
2nk
m
)
· 2−2nk
)
·
(
1− 128−1
))
(18)
3.3.4 Breaking the Chaotic Map with both fm and Q
All the above-mentioned algorithms are based on only-one known plain-image.
When more than one plain/cipher-image is known, the constructed swapping
(0, 1)-matrix Q will be very useful to increase the efficiency of the attack.
As already known, the mask image fm can be amended using the swapping
information stored in Q. Since all amended elements in fm are also values in
S4, it is obvious that the efficiency of the search algorithm for finding correct
random seeds will be increased. In addition, the swapping matrix Q can be
used to uniquely determine some bits in {b(24k+ 16 + i)}7i=0 without checking
fm(16k + 2i) ∈ S4 and fm(16k + 2i + 1) ∈ S4. Thus, the total complexity in
finding a correct chaotic state will be less, and the attack will succeed faster.
When two or more plain-images and/or cipher-images are known, most swapped
pixels can be successfully distinguished. In this case, it is much easier to find
a pixel-block of fm whose elements are all in S4, which means that Seed1(k),
Seed2(k) can be quickly guessed by enumerating all values in S4, and all the
8 bits {b(24k + 16 + i)}7i=0 can be absolutely determined. This implies that
the attack complexity is minimized to be the complexity of breaking RCES’s
weaker parent – CKBA [28].
3.4 The Combined Known-Plaintext Attack
The above two known-plaintext attacks have their disadvantages: the first
attack cannot decrypt the cipher-images larger than MN (the size of fm),
and the second one cannot decrypt all pixels before the position where the
first correct chaotic state x(k) is found. One can combine them, however, to
make a better known-plaintext attack without these disadvantages: use the
first attack to decrypt the pixels before x(k) and then use the second attack
to decrypt the others. Figure 11 shows the performance of this combined
attack with only one known plain-image, where the recovered chaotic state in
the second attack is selected as x(1673) (see also Fig. 10c), which can clearly
show the boundary of the two parts decrypted by the two attacks.
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a) The recovered
plain-image f∗Peppers
b) The recovered larger
plain-image f∗Peppers2,768×768
Fig. 11. The recovery performance of the combined known-plaintext attack.
3.5 The Chosen-Plaintext Attack
Apparently, all the above three known-plaintext attacks can be extended to
chosen-plaintext attacks.
For the first kind of known-plaintext attack, the chosen-plaintext version can
achieve much better recovery performance with a nearly-perfect mask image
fm, by choosing only one plain-image whose pixels are all fixed to be the same
gray value. Given such a plain-image, from Corollary 1, any recovered plain-
pixel will be the plain-pixel itself or its adjacent pixel. Thus, although the
recovery error bounded by a1 = f1(16k + 2i) ⊕ f1(16k + 2i + 1) may still be
large, it is expected that the visual quality of the recovered plain-image will
be much better. It is also expected that all salt-pepper impulsive noises will
disappear and a dithering effect of edges will occur, which is demonstrated in
Fig. 12c with the plain-image f ∗Peppers recovered from the chosen plain-image
shown in Fig. 12a. As a natural result, the visual quality of the recovered
plain-image f ∗Peppers becomes much better as compared with the one shown in
Fig. 4a.
Similarly to the known-plaintext attack, with some image processing tech-
niques, the recovered plain-image in the chosen-plaintext attack can also be
enhanced to further provide a better visual quality. Now, the question is: can
one maximize the visual quality with an optimization algorithm? The answer
is yes. In fact, with a subtly-designed algorithm, almost all dithering edges can
be perfectly polished and a matrix Q containing partial swapping information
can be constructed with only one chosen plain-image. In the following, this
efficient algorithm and its real performance are studied in detail.
The proposed algorithm divides the image into 2n-pixel blocks for enhance-
ment, where 2n can exactly divide M . The basic idea is to exhaustively search
the optimal swapping states of all pixels to achieve the minimal differential
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a) The chosen plain-image
fGray
b) The mask image fGray,m
c) The recovered plain-image
f∗Peppers
d) The recovery error∣∣∣f∗Peppers − fPeppers∣∣∣
Fig. 12. The recovery performance of the chosen-plaintext attack.
errors. For the m-th 2n-pixel block fB(m) = {f(m ·2n+i)}2n−1i=0 , the algorithm
works as follows:
(1) set {bs(i) = 0}n−1i=0 and ∆min = 256(n− 1);
(2) for (b0, · · · , bn−1) = (
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0) ∼ (
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, · · · , 1), do
(a) assign A = {a0, · · · , a2n−1} = fB(m);
(b) for i = 0 ∼ n− 1, do Swapbi(a2i, a2i+1);
(c) calculate ∆A = |a2−a1|+ |a4−a3|+ · · ·+ |a2i−a2i−1|+ · · ·+ |a2n−2−
a2n−3|;
(d) if ∆A < ∆min, then set ∆min = ∆A and {bs(i) = bi}n−1i=0 .
(3) for i = 0 ∼ n− 1, do Swapbs(i)(f(m · 2n+ 2i), f(m · 2n+ 2i+ 1));
(4) set the corresponding elements of the swapping matrix Q to be 1 for
bs(i) = 1.
The complexity of the above algorithm is O(2n ·MN). When M = N = 256
and n = 8, it is less than 224, which is practical even on PCs.
For the recovered plain-image f ∗Peppers shown in Fig. 12c, the above algorithm
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has been tested with parameter n = 8, and the result is given in Figs. 13a
and 13b. Although the enhanced plain-image have 14378 (about 21.94% of all)
pixels different from the original plain-image, its visual quality is so perfect
that no any visual degradation can be distinguished. In fact, in a sense, the
enhanced plain-image can be considered as a better version of the original one,
since each 2n-pixel block of the former reaches the minimum of the accumu-
lated differential error. From such a point of view, this optimization algorithm
can also be used to enhance the visual quality of the plain-image recovered by
a known-plaintext attack. For the recovered plain-image shown in Fig. 4a, the
enhancing result is given in Figs. 13c and 13d. It can be seen that dithering
edges existing in the plain-image shown in Fig. 4a have been polished.
a) Enhancing the
plain-image f∗Peppers shown
in Fig. 12c
b) The recovery error of a)
c) Enhancing the
plain-image f∗Peppers shown
in Fig. 4a
d) The recovery error of c)
Fig. 13. The performance of the optimization algorithm discussed in Sec. 3.5, when
n = 8.
In the above algorithm, most swapped operations can be distinguished by
using the minimum-detecting rule on the accumulated differential error of
fB(m), which means that most elements in Q are correct for showing the real
values of the swapping directive bits {b(24k+ 16 + i}7i=0. Once 32 consecutive
correct elements (two 16-pixel blocks) in Q have been found, it is possible to
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derive µ and a chaotic state x(k), like in the situation of the second known-
plaintext attack.
4 Lessons Learned from RCES/CKBA
From the above cryptanalysis of RCES, some principles can be suggested for
the design of good image encryption schemes. Although the security of RCES
and CKBA against the known/chosen-plaintext attack is very weak, they are
still useful as typical carelessly-designed examples to show what one should
do and what one should not do 6 .
4.1 Principle 1: Security against the known/chosen-plaintext attacks should
be provided
As surveyed in [36], besides CKBA/RCES, many other image encryption
schemes are also insecure against the known/chosen-plaintext attack. How-
ever, without the capability against the known/chosen-plaintext attacks, it will
be insecure to repeatedly use the same secret key to encrypt multiple image
files. When the cryptosystems are used to encrypt image streams transmitted
over networks, this problem can be relaxed due to the use of time-variant ses-
sion keys [40]. Considering that most image encryption systems are proposed
to encrypt local image files, the security against the known/chosen-plaintext
attacks is generally required.
4.2 Principle 2: Do not use invertible encryption function
Rewrite the encryption function of a symmetric cipher as C = E(P,K). The
function E(·, ·) is said to be invertible, if K can be derived from C and P
with its inverse function E−1(·, ·), i.e., K = E−1(P,C). Most modern ciphers
employs a mixture of operations defined in different groups to make the en-
cryption function non-invertible.
In RCES/CKBA, the encryption function is XOR, which is an invertible oper-
ation since P ⊕K = C ⇒ K = P ⊕C. It is the essential reason why the mask
image fm can be used as an equivalent of the real key (x(0), µ). Similarly, the
invertibility of the swapping operations is the reason for the success of the
dithering-removal algorithm discussed in the chosen-plaintext attack.
6 For more discussions on how to design a good image encryption schemes, see Sec.
4.5 of [36].
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To enhance the security of RCES, the XOR operation can be replaced with
some key-dependent invertible functions. Another way is to replace the swap-
ping operation with more complex long-distance permutation operations, such
as the ones used in [8–11]. If both operations are changed as above, the se-
curity will be further enhanced. References [8–11] suggest some typical image
ciphers that use such an idea to ensure the security against the known/chosen-
plaintext attacks.
4.3 Principle 3: The correlation information within the plain-image should
be sufficiently reduced
As shown in the previous section, the high correlation information between ad-
jacent pixels is an important reason of the good performances for the known/chosen-
plaintext attacks. In fact, there exists a large amount of correlation information
within digital images, even between pixels whose distances are large, such as
pixels in a smooth area. To provide sufficient security against attacks, the cor-
relation information within the plain-image should be sufficiently concealed. A
typical method to conceal the correlation information is to carry out complex
long-distance permutation operations [8–11]. Note that the long-distance per-
mutations are not necessary conditions, but sufficient ones, since any secure
text cipher can also provide enough security for digital images.
4.4 Principle 4: Any non-uniformity existing in the cipher-images should be
avoided
From a cryptographer’s point of view, any non-uniformity is not welcome
due to the risk of causing statistics-based attacks, such as the well-known
differential attacks [40]. So, it should be carefully checked whether or not
there exists any non-uniformity in the ciphertexts.
The essential reason for the insecurity of RCES/CKBA against the known/chosen-
plaintext attacks can also be ascribed to the non-uniformity of the distribution
of f(l)⊕ f ′(l) over {0, · · · , 255}:
• for any unswapped pixel, Prob[f(l) ⊕ f ′(l) = Seed(l)] = 1, i.e., the distri-
bution is one with the most non-uniformity;
• for any swapped pixel, the distribution of f(l) ⊕ f ′(l) has the same non-
uniformity level as the one of f(l)⊕ f(l+ 1) (see the distribution of f (⊕)Peppers
shown in Fig. 5).
This also suggests that all pixels should be permuted. Actually, in the second
known-plaintext attack, the feasibility of the quick-search algorithm in finding
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the two random seeds is benefited from the non-uniformity of the distribution
of
{
f˜m(16k + j)
}15
j=0
over the discrete set {0, · · · , 127}. If each f˜m(16k + j)
distributes uniformly over {0, · · · , 127}, the exhaustive search algorithm will
be practically impossible when the block size is changed to a sufficiently large
value.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, it has been pointed out that the RCES/RSES image encryp-
tion method recently proposed in [19, 20] is not secure enough against the
known/chosen-plaintext attacks, and that the security against brute-force at-
tack was overestimated. Both theoretical and experimental analyses have been
given to support the feasibility of the known/chosen-plaintext attacks. The in-
security of RCES are caused by a careless design, and some principles on good
design of secure image encryption schemes can be learned from the weakness
of RCES. In summary, although RCES cannot be used in practice as a secure
cipher to protect digital images, it provides a typical example for caution.
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Appendix
Here we give the proof of Proposition 2, which has occurred in Page 423 of [41]
(but with different notations).
Proposition 2 Assume that the Logistic map x(k + 1) = µ · x(k) · (1− x(k))
is iterated with L-bit fixed-point arithmetic and that x(k + 1) ≥ 2−n, where
1 ≤ n ≤ L. Then, the following inequality holds: |µ − µ˜k| ≤ 2n+3/2L, where
µ˜k =
x(k + 1)
x(k) · (1− x(k)) .
Proof : In L-bit fixed-point arithmetic, µ, x(k), and x(k+1) all have L binary
decimal bits, and the quantization error of x(k + 1) can be explained in the
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following equation:
x(k + 1) =
(
µ · x(k) + e′x(k+1)
)
· (1− x(k)) + e′′x(k+1)
=µ · x(k) · (1− x(k)) + ex(k+1),
where
∣∣∣ex(k+1)∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣e′x(k+1) · (1− x(k)) + e′′x(k+1)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣e′x(k+1)∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣e′′x(k+1)∣∣∣. Con-
sidering
∣∣∣e′x(k+1)∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣e′′x(k+1)∣∣∣ < 2−L for floor/ceil quantization functions and∣∣∣e′x(k+1)∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣e′′x(k+1)∣∣∣ ≤ 2−(L+1) for the round function, ∣∣∣ex(k+1)∣∣∣ < 2−(L−1) is true
in all cases. Then, the quantization error
∣∣∣eµ˜k ∣∣∣ = |µ− µ˜k| can be estimated as
follows:
∣∣∣eµ˜k ∣∣∣=
∣∣∣∣∣x(k + 1) + ex(k+1)x(k) · (1− x(k)) − x(k + 1)x(k) · (1− x(k))
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ ex(k+1)x(k + 1) · x(k + 1)x(k) · (1− x(k))
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣ex(k+1)∣∣∣
x(k + 1)
· µ
<
2−(L−1) · µ
x(k + 1)
≤ 4
2L−1 · x(k + 1) =
1
2L−3 · x(k + 1) .
When x(k + 1) ≥ 2−n (n = 1 ∼ L),
∣∣∣eµ˜k ∣∣∣ < 12L−3 · x(k + 1) ≤ 2
n
2L−3
= 2n+3/2L. (19)
This finishes the proof of the proposition. 
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